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ABSTRACT : The 2007 financial crises  has brought to eminence and a  long overdue 
recognition to  the ideas of Hyman. P Minsky who is a post-Keynesian authority on monetary 
theory and financial institutions. He had extensively1 studied the economic fluctuations and 
recurring instability of the financial system in a capitalist economy in an attempt to understand 
and explain the characteristics of financial crises. Many analysts believe that Minsky's 
framework of analysis has accurately anticipated the financial crisis of 2007 and termed it as the 
Minsky moment. His financial instability hypothesis (FIH) rejected the mainstream economic 
concepts of the efficient market theory which believes that force of invisible hands keep the 
markets clear. Minsky observed that periods of financial instability are common and it is the 
government‟s massive interventions since the World War II which has contained their effects. In 
the aftermath of financial meltdown of 2007, many financial analysts e.g. Magnus 2007; 
McCauley, 2008 and economists like Kregel 1997, 2008; Papadimitriou and Wray 2008; 
Passarella 2010; Tymoigne and Wray 2008; Vercelli 2001, 2009a ,Wray 2008), Damiano Silipo  
2010,  have referred to the contributions Minsky as fundamental to understand the tendency of 
capitalistic economies to fall into recurring crises and for a consistent policy design . Minsky 
believed that regulation should be linked to the structure of the financial system and effective 
policy making requires an understanding of the dynamics of an accumulating capitalist economy. 
These policies would have to constrain instability through creation of institutional ceilings and 
floors while at the same time they would have to address the behavioral changes induced by 
reduction of instability. Minsky‟s proposals go far beyond the 'invisible handwaves' of free 
market ideologues. 
                                                 
1The economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s and the crisis of economic theory and policy that accompanied it may have come as a 
surprise to most of the profession, but Professor Minsky would have been surprised if such crises failed to materialize. There are two 
key building blocks in Minsky‘s work on capitalist instability: his theory of investment and his theory of profit determination. They 





The 2007 financial crises generally believed to have been ignited by the collapse of the subprime 
mortgage market, has brought to eminence the ideas of Hyman. P Minsky who is a post-
Keynesian authority on monetary theory and financial institutions. When the mainstream of the 
economics profession was almost unanimously celebrating the demise of the business cycle and 
the commencement of uninterrupted economic prosperity in the mid-60s, Minsky urged about the 
endogeneity of cyclical instability and the transitory nature of the institutional underpinnings of 
financial markets2. He had extensively3 studied the economic fluctuations and recurring 
instability of the financial system in a capitalist economy in an attempt to understand and explain 
the characteristics of financial crises. Many analysts believe that Minsky's framework of analysis 
has accurately anticipated the financial crisis of 2007 and termed it as the Minsky moment. His 
financial instability hypothesis (FIH) rejected the mainstream economic concepts of the efficient 
market theory which believes that force of invisible hands keep the markets clear and stable 
always, rather Minsky  argued that successful containment of instability led to the evolution of 
fragile financial structures which result in renewed financial crisis. The problem as Minsky 
viewed it is that the institutional reforms have not evolved to keep pace with innovations that 
make it more likely that "it‖ might happen again. 
 
The role of uncertainty in macroeconomic models, its effect on the stability of the economy, 
nature of regulatory superstructure and the role envisaged for fiscal and monetary policy in  the 
period of and after the financial crisis are the  themes around which I have defined and 
characterize  the research  questions for my PhD dissertation which  “investigates the genesis of 
the financial crises of 2007, it affects on emerging markets economies and shape of the regulatory 
framework required to have more stable financial markets”. The existence of the 
interrelationships between finances, investment and economic fluctuation is one of the key 
features of contemporary market economies. Analyzing these interrelationships requires the 
careful study of various and often intricate questions to which Minsky was as an economist4. 
Underlying the financial dynamics implied by the FIH, Minsky‘s financial theory of investment, 
associated with his analysis of financial fragility and endogenous instability can be found. This 
aspect of his analysis is fundamental obviously because it makes Minsky‘s approach specific and 
original in comparison to the traditional macroeconomic analysis. It is also the paramount feature 
of his work to attract the attention of writers and policy makers in the wake of recent events of 
2007 meltdown. The collapse of the sub-prime market in 2007 has been broadly labeled as 
“Minsky moment5,” (Cassidy 2008; Chancellor 2007; McCauley 2007; Whalen 2007) followed 
by the subsequent implosion of the financial system and deep recession which is seen as the 
confirmation of FIH.  Financial (and government) authorities all around the world implemented 
set of policies to contain the catastrophe but somehow a suitable analysis of the FIH remained 
missing which can point out the weaknesses of the dominant market-oriented monetary and 
financial regulatory framework. For in-depth comprehension of this issue a Minskian approach of 
the economic instability resulting of cumulative euphoric expectations can be used as theoretical 
guideline which distrusts the orthodox beliefs about the self-regulation of market mechanisms to 
                                                 
2
 Marx, Keynes, and Minsky on the Instability of the Capitalist Growth Process and the Nature of Government Economic Policy 
James R. Crotty: 1986 
3The economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s and the crisis of economic theory and policy that accompanied it may have come as a 
surprise to most of the profession, but Professor Minsky would have been surprised if such crises failed to materialize. There are two 
key building blocks in Minsky‘s work on capitalist instability: his theory of investment and his theory of profit determination. They 
also constitute the foundation for his conclusion that the financial sector is the exclusive source of instability in a capitalist economy.   
4
 His main achievement was the conception and elaboration of the financial instability hypothesis, the notion that embraces three 
important aspects; a financial and dynamic dimension; a particular view of the behavior of economic agents in situation of uncertainty 
and an institutional dimension 
5
 Paul McCulley, an economist and bond fund manager at Pacific Investment Management  is said to have coined the term "Minsky 
moment" during the Russian debt crisis of 1998 
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correct judgmental errors of private agents without imposing collective regulation (Ulgen, 2010). 
A Minskian lecture of the financial turmoil in the aftermath of 2007 events would lead monetary 
and financial authorities to carve out more consistent policies. 
 
In this aim this paper based on the chapter of a thesis is divided in to 4 sections. First section 
briefly describes the importance of financial stability for the real economy. Section two covers 
the state of the art literature review about the FIH as an explanation for financial crises. Section 
there gave a comparison is between FIH and efficient market hypothesis. Fourth section draws on 
Minsky‘s views as a guideline for regularity response. Fourth section concludes. 
 
 
1; Financial Markets,  Financial Stability  and  Real Economy. The role of 
finance and financial markets in economic growth and its connection with stability and crisis have 
received immense importance from researcher and policy makers in last three decades. 
Consequently the imperative of understanding these interrelationship vis- a- Vis a policy 
formulation for future prevention of the recurrences of financial crises and resulting recession are 
transcendentally important issues.6 A synthesis7 of Marx‘s monetary ideas, Keynes‘s ideas 
developed in his General Theory, Schumpeter‘s thesis of creative destruction, Charles 
Kindleberger‘s analysis of displacements in Manias, Panics, and Crashes8 and Minsky‘s 
financial instability hypothesis suggest an appropriate theoretical framework for investigating the 
role of finance in economic and financial instability and development of financial crisis in 
capitalistic economies. Keynes‘s (1936) and Minsky‘s historical and institutional  (1977; 1982a; 
1982b; 1986, 1992) analyses suggest a brilliant and deep understanding of the impact the 
monetary and financial system has on industrial performance and the functioning of a market 
economy in the context of an uncertain and changeable environment. Minsky observed that 
periods of financial instability are common and it is the government‘s massive interventions since 
the World War II which has contained their effects. He criticized the monetarists for narrowly 
defining the financial crises and limiting these only to bank panics (Schwartz 1988, 1998), and 
rejecting the events that would have been catastrophic if the government had not intervened 
(Sinai 1976; Minsky 1986; Mishkin 1991).  
 
Financial Crises of 2007 is now well into its third year. All sorts of explanations have been 
proffered for the causes of the crisis, from lax regulation and oversight to excessive global 
liquidity. Unfortunately, these narratives do not take into account the systemic nature of the 
global crisis and the evolution of financial markets in last two decades. Nevertheless Minsky‘s 
analysis correctly links postwar developments with the prewar ―finance capitalism‖ analyzed by 
Rudolf Hilferding, Thorstein Veblen, Keynes and later by Galbraith. Financial markets have 
developed to its apex and have served as the driver of growth in the last two decades and 
consequently the subject of preserving financial stability is receiving immense importance both in 
advanced and EMEs countries. Financial stability designates the condition that ensures smooth 
financial intermediation and the confidence that key financial institutions and markets are 
operating well. Financial instability on contrary can be very costly due to its contagion or 
spillover effects to other parts of the economy. Indeed, it may lead to a financial crisis with 
                                                 
6
 ―Financial Market Regulation in the Wake of Financial Crises: The Historical Experience‖ Edited by Alfredo Gigliobianco and 
Gianni Toniolo, the Banca d‟Italia series Workshops and Conferences. 
7
 Finance, Instability and Economic Crisis: The Marx, Keynes and Minsky Problems in Contemporary Capitalism By George Argitis 
(2003) 
8
 This approach views financial crises as the culmination of a process that does not inevitably lead to a crisis but often may because 
the dynamics of belief (called adaptive expectations), financed by excessive credit creation, often result in speculative excesses or 
manias. Kindleberger does not blame markets per se for creating the circumstances in which irrationality can take over—on the whole 
he regards markets as generally efficient but often in need of help.  His view is distinct both from the free marketers who regard 
markets as always rational and efficient and the hyper-regulators who believe that markets work badly most of the time and need 
intense government oversight. 
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adverse consequences for the real economy. Hence, it is fundamental to have a sound, stable and 
healthy financial system to support the efficient allocation of resources and distribution of risks 
across the economy. Stability in the financial system would be demonstrated by an effective 
regulatory infrastructure, effective and well-developed financial markets and sound financial 
institutions. To achieve the objective the authorities relies on market forces to the maximum 
possible extent with a faith that any of its actions to contain systemic risk should be at the 
minimum level required to be effective (Ulgen 2008). Conversely, it could manifest through bank 
failures, intense asset price volatility or a collapse of market liquidity and, ultimately, in a 
disruption in the payment and settlement system. The conventional economic wisdom postulates 
that the economy is naturally stable, with the invisible hand guiding the economy always to 
equilibrium path. Shocks might temporarily move the economy away from equilibrium, but the 
forces that move us back to equilibrium are strong. Financial  markets dislike  Cassandra‘s and  
use of the contemporary economic theory as the basis for policy formulations drips the idea that 
markets equilibrium is just a transitory period (Riccardo Bellofiore and Joseph Halevi, 2009)  
Rather than viewing institutions as contributing to stability, orthodoxy views institutions as 
barriers to achieving equilibrium. In contrast, Minsky's vision, insists that "institutions and 
interventions thwart the instability breeding dynamics that are natural to market economies by 
interrupting the endogenous process and 'starting' the economy again with non-market determined 
values as ―initial conditions‖. (Minsky and Ferri, 1991, p. 4).  
 
2;Key Literature Review on The Minskian Analysis of Financial Crises 
& Instability in Capitalistic Economy; In the last few years and particularly in the 
aftermath of financial meltdown of 2007, many financial analysts  (Magnus 2007) and economists 
like Kregel 1997, 2008; Papadimitriou and Wray 2008; Passarella 2010; Tymoigne and Wray 
2008; Vercelli 2001, 2009a ,Wray 2008), Damiano Silipo (2010),  have referred to the 
contributions Minsky as fundamental to understand the tendency of capitalistic economies to fall 
into recurring crises. In fact, according to many observers, both the ‗dot-com‘ crash of 2000-02 
and the burst of the so called ‗subprime housing loan‘ crisis at the beginning of 2007 would 
confirm many of Minsky‘s forecasts: from the growing financial fragility of the economic system 
as the result of a previous period of ‗tranquil growth‘ to the risk of a credit crunch and a 
widespread debt deflation; from the gradual loosening of safety margins to the reduction in the 
time elapsing between one crisis and another. Minsky saw modern capitalism as an inherently 
unstable system governed by the behaviour of private investment (Marc Lavoie and Mario 
Seccareccia, 2000), endogenized finance and pointed to the dynamic interaction of financial 
sector with industrial sector as the source of that endogenous instability (Dymski and Pollin 1992, 
p38) and institutional dynamic of the business fluctuations ( Nasica Eric, 2000). We reassess 
these works in the following section for the better understanding of the relevance of Minsky‘s 
framework to the crises of 2007. 
 
a)NASICA Eric, 2000: “Finance, Investment and the Economic Fluctuations: An 
analysis in the tradition of Hyman Minsky”; to examine how financial factors could be more 
appropriately introduced into the analysis of economic fluctuations, the line of research initiated 
by Minsky at the end of 1950s  is quite relevant.  Minsky developed an approach where the role 
of uncertainty and the behaviour it generates, the dynamic instability of market economies, the 
role of money is duly recognized. Minsky constructed an original business cycle theory known as 
FIH9, essentially an important contribution in an attempt to propose a true explanation about the 
working of contemporary macroeconomics. His approach rests upon an endogenous and financial 
conception of the economic fluctuations which is completely in contradiction with the vision of 
self -regulating and constantly in- equilibrium economy depicted by the new classical economists. 
Another central aspect of Minsky‘s approach is the institutional dimension of economic 
                                                 
9
 sometimes known  as Wall Street paradigm  
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fluctuations.  In his theory institutional factors such as public authority‘s interventions affect the 
nature of the business cycle in way that is ambivalent.  Institutions act as ―thwarting systems‖ 
whose purpose is to counteract and contain the naturally explosive amplitude of economic 
fluctuations. Thus they themselves   become factors of instability and inefficiency. For Minsky 
the various institutions function is to slow down and adjust the dynamics process at the origin if 
the economy‘s endogenous and incoherent behaviour. This situation calls for introducing on a 
sustained basis a new initial condition into the system which modifies the behaviour of the 
markets and alters the parameters affecting economic agents‘ decisions. In short the institutional 
character of the analysis  provides a relevant theoretical framework for understanding  the role of 
stabilizing institutional mechanism that are present in financially sophisticated economies. 
 
b)Dimitri B. Papadimitriou and L. Randall Wray; 1999, “Minsky’s analysis of 
financial capitalism” presented a very informative analysis of Minsky‘s theory.  They argue 
that Minsky's analysis always concerned "modern" capitalism which can also be pronounced as 
financial capitalism because of the important role played by financial arrangements in this sort of 
economy. The New Deal and postwar reforms successfully constrained the natural instabilities of 
financial capitalism for a longer time but is very successful containment of instability led to the 
gradual buildup of fragile financial structures paving the course for renewed financial crisis. The 
problem as Minsky see it, is that the institutional reforms have not progressed to keep pace with 
innovations that make it more likely that "it" might happen again. Authors also assert that the 
propensity to runaway speculative boom has increased in the last two decades pointing towards 
the savings and loan fiasco in the US during the 1980s, to the mid-1990s Asian "tiger" financial 
crisis, and to the late 1990s US stock market boom as examples of speculative excesses-- a point 
truly recognized by Minsky in his analysis 
 
c)Tymoigne E. and Wray L.R. (2008) “Macroeconomics meets Hyman P. Minsky: the 
financial theory of investment” authors argued that the current financial crisis undoubtedly 
provides a persuasive cognitive to show how Minsky‘s approach offers the sound grounding in 
the workings of financial capitalism. The collapse of subprime housing loans and resulting 
financial crises has also earned a long overdue recognition for Minsky.  Minsky developed an 
alternative to the standard approach developed in the early 70s, based on the ―efficient markets 
hypothesis‖ that relegates money and finance to the sidelines. Minsky strongly believed that such 
theory is irrelevant to serve the requirements a modern capitalist economy which is comprised of  
complex, expensive, and long-lived capital assets and emphasized that instability is a normal 
result of modern financial capitalism (Minsky 1986: 101, 250).  Further, stability cannot be 
maintained permanently even with appropriate policy10. Minsky argued that the relative stability 
of the post-war period had led to development of Money Manager Capitalism; a much more 
unstable version of modern capitalism. In a prescient paper written in 1987 Minsky predicted the 
explosion of home-mortgage securitization. Minsky argued that the long depression-free period 
that followed WWII created a global glut of managed money seeking returns. The importance of 
banks was rapidly eroded in favor of ―markets‖ in post war era.  Gradually this development was 
further encouraged by the experiment in monetarism (1979–82) which decimated the regulated 
portion of the financial sector in favor of relatively unregulated ―markets,‖ and the continual 
erosion of the portion of the financial sphere that had been ceded by rules, regulations, and 
tradition to banks further spurred this trend. Now financial markets had the advantage of 
operating with much lower spreads due to exemptions   from required reserve ratios, regulated 
capital requirements, and certain costs of relationship banking. Financial markets were also 
remained out of the spheres of  the New Deal regulations which made them more safer which 
                                                 
10
 For this reason, Minsky rejected ―Keynesian‖ policy that promoted ―fine-tuning‖ of the economy—even if policy did achieve 
transitory stability, it would set off processes to reintroduce instability. Hence, ―[t]he policy problem is to devise institutional 
structures and measures that attenuate the thrust to inflation, unemployment, and slower improvements in the standard of living 
without increasing the likelihood of a deep depression‖ (Minsky 1986: 295). 
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simply means that  larger chunk of financial sector was actually free  of most regulation. All of 
this greatly increased fragility of the financial system which eventually ushered into subprime 
loan crises in the USA.  
 
d) Dimitri B. Papadimitriou and L. Randall Wray, 1998: "The Economic 
Contribution of Hyman Minsky: Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Reform,”: 
Minsk‘s analysis concerned an evolving, developed, big-government capitalist economy with 
complex and long-lived financial arrangements. These essay summaries the Minsky‘s early work, 
including his well-known financial instability hypothesis and his policy proposals designed to 
reform the financial system. Accordingly during the 60s, Minsky developed the FIH in an attempt 
to answer the question “can it happen again”. Minsky continuously argued that “stability is 
destabilizing”. FIH postulates that the economy has financing regimes under which it is stable, 
and financing regimes in which it is unstable and  over periods of prolonged prosperity, the 
economy transits from financial relations that make for a stable system to financial relations that 
make for an unstable system' (Minsky, 1992c, p 7-8). Minsky argued 'The policy problem is to 
devise institutional structures and measures that attenuate the thrust to inflation, unemployment, 
and slower improvements in the standard of living without increasing the likelihood of a deep 
depression. His policy recommendations were designed to promote a successful form of 
capitalistic model within these financial arrangements. According to him policies would have to 
'constrain' instability through creation of institutional 'ceilings and floors' while at the same rime 
addressing the behavioral changes induced by reduction of instability.  
 
e) Vercelli Alessandro (2009) “A Perspective on Minsky Moments: The Core of the 
Financial Instability Hypothesis in Light of the Subprime Crisis” This paper aims to help 
bridge the gap between theory and fact regarding the so-called ―Minsky moments‖ by revisiting 
the ―financial instability hypothesis‖ (FIH) and tried to clarify and develop the core of the FIH in 
the light of recent financial crises. Vercelli has limited his analysis to FIH‘s financial part strictly 
and builds on a reexamination of Minsky‘s contributions in light of the subprime financial crisis 
of 2007. Author began with some constructive criticism of the well-known Minskyan taxonomy 
of hedge, speculative, and Ponzi financial units and suggested a different approach that allows a 
continuous measure of the unit‘s financial conditions. He argued that the Minsky process is 
nothing but a well-defined phase of a financial cycle that may be well explained by the core of the 
FIH. He has shown   that each cycle is part of a sequence of financial cycles with its particular 
characteristics that depend on the structural features of the economy and the prevalent policy 
strategies. To mitigate the financial cycle some policy insights can be dawn e.g.; stricter capital 
requirements of units and constraints on illiquidity and indebtedness useful stabilize the economy.  
Implementation these policies are very important and financial authorities should enforce rules 
regardless of the cycle phase. Minsky frequently repeated that the only effective stabilization 
measures are those that intervene much before the first serious stress symptoms emerge11.  
 
f) Damiano B. Silipo (2010),  “It happened again :A Minskian analysis of the 
subprime loan crisis” The advanced countries are now going through the worst crisis since the 
Depression, but Silipo in his article posits that  today‘s dominant current theories and 
econometric models failed  to predict the crisis of 2007 . Thus the paper investigates whether the 
financial instability hypothesis of Hyman P. Minsky offers a better explanation despite the fact 
that Minsky‘s theory is a more general, offering a financial explanation of the business cycle.  
Minsky argued that in a period of economic growth and tranquility economic agents are more 
prone to risk taking resultantly banks are more willing to finance risky borrowers even. Gradually 
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 All the other extemporaneous stabilization measures, though often unavoidable, may ease the situation in the short period only at the 
cost of sowing the seeds of higher instability in the future. 
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in the course of the boom over-indebtedness and financial innovations create more fragility in the 
financial system leaving it exposed to adverse effects. Minsky explanation truly describes the 
events of 2007 and authors have shown that the main determinants of the crisis have been the 
increasing appetite for risk and financial innovations. However there is one difference: in 
Minsky‘s analysis of the business cycle (ideal type boom/bust), key players are banks and firms 
but in the 2007 crisis the central role was played by households, not firms. Nevertheless as 
Minsky hypothesized, financial institutions failures and securitization did play a crucial role in 
transforming difficulties of borrowers in to systemic crises. This led them conclude that, although 
this crisis differs in some of its features from previous crashes and from Minsky‘s analysis but, 
the mechanisms underscored by Minsky were and are at work. 
 
g) Whalen Charles, 2008 “Credit Crunch: A Minsky Moment” This paper validates the 
credit crunch of 2007 as the Minsky moment. Whalen is very  vocal in stressing that pulling out 
Minsky‘s ideas only during a crisis, then letting them fall back into obscurity when the crisis 
fades, does a disservice to his contributions, which continue to speak to us in meaningful ways 
about the financial system and economic dynamics. He argued that it is possible to identify some 
of the key elements that must play a role in a Minsky specific explanation of the 2007 credit 
crunch. After the bursting of ―dot-com‖ bubble at the beginning of the new millennium, real 
estate seemed the only safe heavens of investment furthered by a loose monetary policy and low 
interest rate environment by the Fed. It was the time when lenders  very creatively enticed 
increasingly less creditworthy home buyers into the market with exotic mortgages—for example, 
―interest-only‖ loans and ―option adjustable rate‖ mortgages ect. The new players of the un 
regulated strata of the mortgage markets took the alluring opportunity to promote new products 
because they were highly profitable for banks, which in turn offered the brokers high 
commissions. Whalen has explained that securitization of mortgages meant that bankers bundled 
dozens of mortgages together and sliced them and then sold the bundles to investment funds such 
as hedge funds, which in turn used these mortgage bundles as collateral for highly leveraged 
loans.in his opinion fragile regulatory environment led the buildup of the subprime fiasco which 
later on turned into a systemic risk and whole sale financial crises. 
 
h) Randall Wray 2008; “Financial Markets Meltdown. What Can We Learn from 
Minsky?: it‘s a norm now to use Minsky‘s financial fragility hypothesis to explain the current 
crisis. Minsky hypothesized that the structure of a capitalist economy becomes more fragile over 
a period of prosperity.  Wray expressed that the belief that the world is now more stable and less 
vulnerable to ―shocks‖ (the ―Great Moderation‖) encouraged greed in place of fear of risk.  In an 
historical analysis Wray has explained about the origins of the current turmoil can be traced back 
to the period of relative stability when the policies deregulation accompanied by lax oversight, 
and evolution of risky innovation sown the seeds of the current turmoil. Wray asters that    
irrational exuberance of the 1990s ( based on the beliefs of the new economy)  and unprecedented 
real estate appreciation validated the  risky Ponzi finance in the 2000s, is the result of long-term, 
policy-induced, profit-seeking financial innovations. Wray draws lessons from Minsky‘s work 
that could be used to reformulate a consist policy to deal with the present crisis. .  As Minsky put 
it, ―A financial crisis is not the time to teach markets a lesson by allowing a generalized debt 
deflation to ‗simplify‘ the system.‖ Accordingly a more sensible model of enhanced oversight of 
financial institutions must put in place to ensure stability of the system. To stabilize interest rates, 
maintain direct credit controls, and strengthen its supervisory and regulatory functions monetary 
policy must be conducted in due accuracy. 
 
i) Fernandez, Luisa, Kaboub, Fadhel & Todorova, Zdravka; 2010“Inequality led 
financial stability: A Minskian Analysis of the Subprime Crisis. This paper use Minsky‘s 
financial instability hypothesis as an analytical framework for the understanding the subprime 
mortgage crisis of the 2007   and calls for introducing adequate reforms to restore economic 
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stability. After the subprime crises large number of post Keynesian and Institutionalists pointed 
towards the relevance of FIH to the crises.  Authors argued that the subprime crisis has structural 
origins that extend far beyond the housing and financial markets. They believe that he rising 
inequality since the 1980s formed the breeding ground for the current financial markets 
meltdown. Current situation is only the manifestation of the ingenuity of the market system in 
taking the advantage of moneymaking opportunities, regardless of the consequences. The so-
called ―democratization of homeownership‖ rapidly turned into record-high delinquencies and 
foreclosures resulting in the catastrophe known as the subprime crises. The sudden turn in market 
expectations led investors and banks to re-evaluate their portfolios, freezing the liquidity in the 
system which eventually resulted in a credit crunch and widespread economic instability.  
Authors have criticized the role of Monterey authorities and government because they believe 
that the Fed‘s intervention came too late and ended in complete fiasco  to usher in adequate 
regulation. 
 
3; Financial Instability versus The Market Efficiency12: A Minskyian 
Perspective: A core concept of conventional finance is the ―efficient market hypothesis.” 
which articulates that even if individual decision makers get asset prices or portfolio values 
wrong, the market as a whole gets them right i.e. as a group, investors and  lenders are not subject  
to risks of overconfidence . Thus the play of invisible hand keeps the market in equilibrium.  
Minsky believed otherwise and argues that the financial structure of a capitalist economy 
becomes more and more fragile over a period of prosperity. Following section draws on the 
comparative analysis of FIH and EMH. 
 
3.1; Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH)13: The EFH stipulates that all of the available 
information that is relevant to the price of an asset is already embodied in that price. Formally 
stated as "in an informationally efficient market, price changes must be unforcastable if they are 
properly anticipated" was put forward and proved by Paul Samuelson in 1965, subsequently 
explored in studies undertaken by Eugene Fama in 1991 and others. This hypothesis assumes that 
an invisible hand driven by some set of prices which always reflects the underlying fundamental 
value of financial assets. Accordingly market economy should keep free of government 
intervention and regulation. The more it would be free with minimum involvement of 
government, the more stable it would come out. Mantra is that freer it is, more stable it would be. 
Based on this ideology a grand experiment of the laissez-faire utopia conceived by the 
neoclassical school was performed globe wide and later on translated in the free financial markets 
liberalization. A brief description of this ideal state of affairs in the financial markets would be 
good a reminder here. There three key prices i.e. the wage rate, the exchange rate and interest rate 
and the macroeconomic trends are determined by these14.Now of these three central prices, two 
prices, the respective currency‘s external value and the interest rate levels are formed in financial 
markets. In this context the significance of financial markets in the in terms of a country‘s 
macroeconomic development can hardly be overestimated. The traces go back to Léon Walras 
and his theory of exchange and theory of capital, in which decision situations under certainty are 
discussed and equilibrium solutions are demonstrated. This Walrasian concept of equilibrium is at 
the heart of what is described as market fundamentalism or in other words neoclassical orthodoxy 
has been passed on to the financial markets. The Walrasian equilibrium economy is based on the 
precondition of certainty, but this is not applicable to financial markets where prevailing 
uncertainty is a visible feature. In this situation financial market protagonists best can do is to   
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 This section recalls the main debate between the EFM and FIH of Minsky to point out the sources of the instability and assess the 
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form conditional expectations in respect of an uncertain future. In 1970‘s Eugene Fama enters the 
debate and inferred that the restrictive assumptions of the Walrasian equilibrium model are not 
needed in order to arrive at the conclusion that prices and yields in financial markets are fair and 
reasonable and in other words represent efficient solutions. The consequence in terms of 
economic policy was that the state was to largely refrain from exerting any influence on the 
happenings in the financial markets, and deregulation and liberalization become the order of the 
day. Obviously led to economic policy adhered to these principles, dropping of the Bretton 
Woods system, the liberalization of capital movements, and the deregulation in financial market 
are manifestations of this policy. In those heydays of EMH, it was hailed by academic economist 
and financial analysts with general believe that securities markets are extremely efficient in 
reflecting information about individual stocks and market stocks and the stock market as a whole 
(Burton G. Malkiel, 2003).  Fama concluded that there is no important evidence to suggest that 
prices do not adjust to publicly available information, and only limited evidence of privileged 
access to information about prices.15 The adherents of the financial liberalization position  also 
posits that  financial markets left to their own devices are inherently stable and robust financial 
markets possess endogenous forces which achieve and maintain stability and even successfully 
reestablish it if initial equilibrium is disturbed. However these beliefs come under sever test in the 
East Asian currency crises in the late 90s and showed some unraveling but it is the meltdown of 
2007 that has brought its collapse. Nevertheless once the standard reference in macroeconomics 
known as “neoclassical synthesis” has gradually become less influential over the past 25 years 
and is severely questioned after the financial meltdown of 2007. Current crises show that there is 
no longer any justification for the reliance on consistently correct price signals. The idea of 
unrestricted price information (which has hitherto been the basis for deregulation of financial 
markets) has failed completely to process information efficiently. An inconvenient truth about 
capitalism is that efficiency and stability cannot be achieved simultaneously 
 
3.2; Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH). 16 The starting point of Minsky‘s 
theory was the rejection of the neoclassical synthesis. According to Minsky‘s theory, the financial 
structure of a capitalist economy becomes more and more fragile over a period of prosperity.  
During the buildup, enterprises in highly profitable areas of the economy are rewarded 
substantially for taking on increasing amounts of debt, and their success encourages similar 
behaviour by others in the same. Increased profits also fuel the tendency toward greater 
indebtedness by easing lenders‘ worries that new loans might go unpaid (Minsky 1975). Minsky 
fleshed out aspects of the FIH that come to the fore during an expansion. One of these is 
evolution of the economy (or a sector of the economy) from what he called ―hedge‖ finance to 
―speculative‖ finance and then in the direction of ―Ponzi‖ finance. In the so-called hedge case, 
borrowers are able to pay back interest and principal when a loan comes due; in the speculative 
case, they can pay back only the interest and therefore must roll over the financing; and in the 
case of Ponzi finance, companies must borrow even more to make interest payments on their 
existing liabilities (Minsky 1982, p22-23, p66-67, p105-106; and Minsky 1986a, p206-213). The 
FIH stresses that lending as an innovative, profit driven business (Minsky 1992b, p. 6). Both the 
evolutionary tendency toward Ponzi finance and the financial sector‘s drive to innovate are easily 
connected to the recent situation in the U.S. home loan industry, which has seen a rash of 
mortgage innovations and a thrust toward more fragile financing by households, lending 
institutions, and purchasers of mortgage backed securities. The expansionary phase of the FIH 
leads eventually to the Minsky moment. As Minsky writes, ―Whereas experimentation with 
extending debt structures can go on for years and is a process of gradually testing the limits of the 
market, the revaluation of acceptable debt structures, when anything goes wrong, can be quite 
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sudden‖ (Minsky 1982, p67). Without intervention in the form of collective action, usually by the 
central bank, the Minsky moment can engender a meltdown, involving asset values that plummet 
from forced selling and credit that dries up to the point where investment and output fall and 
unemployment rises sharply. This is why Minsky called his FIH ―a model of a capitalist economy 
that does not rely upon exogenous shocks to generate business cycles‖ (Minsky 1992b, p6-8) 
 
4: Minsky’s Vision; A Guideline for Financial and Regulatory Reforms:  
Although Minsky‘s framework certainly shed some light on ways of stabilizing the financial 
cycle of the economy and policy insights to have stable financial structures in a market oriented 
economy. His analytical approach was based on the development of regulatory reforms required 
to manage instability.  In his book ―stabilizing an unstable economy”, Minsky offered an agenda 
for reform that focused on four main areas: big government, employment strategy, financial 
reform and the market power. This section is focused to highlighting briefly his vision of reforms 
related to financial crises and the resulting instability. It can be argued that best solution is the 
prevention of the crises but that requires vigilance. Galbraith argued since long that market 
mechanisms are losing their authority as a regulatory force in America. He suggested that 
economists "are faced with a three-way choice." One possible response is "to deny that anything 
much has happened to the market." Another is "to accept that the market has declined but to 
believe that it can be retrieved." The third is "to accept the decline of the market" and "address 
oneself to considering how the resulting economic performance can be made socially acceptable 
to as many people as possible17" (Galbraith 1978, p. 8-11). However Minsky believed that 
regulation should be linked to the structure of the financial system 18 and effective policy making 
requires an understanding of the short and long term dynamics of an accumulating capitalist 
economy19. In this aim he saw the need to develop theories that improve the understanding of 
these both type of dynamics. Forming and updating such theories should be the primary mission 
of modem economic theory (Ferri and Minsky 1992, p89; Fern and Minsky 1989, p124; Minsky 
1993a). By the 90s, Minsky was thoroughly convinced about the necessity of essential 
institutional reforms within both the financial system and the broader economy.   
 
Minsky was completely aware of the flawed nature of unregulated macroeconomic activity and 
this compelled him to introducing an alternative to neoclassical theory in the early 90s. 
Institutional structure of a capitalistic economy is the fundamental determinant of the path of 
development because it is this structure that facilitates influences, regulates, and constrains 
economic activity. Minsky also stressed the dynamic nature of the institutional structure and his 
alternative policy proposals in the 90s were designed to promote stability though institutional 
dynamics. Minsky had no faith in automatic equilibria by the market participants thus he saw the 
necessity for state intervention. “To contain the evils that market systems can inflict, capitalist 
economies developed sets of institutions and authorities, which can be characterized as the 
equivalent of circuit breakers‖(Minsky et al., 1994, p. 2).  
 
Another set of proposals were for the central bank and these are particularly relevant to the crises 
of 2007. Minsky also believed that Fed‘s willingness to intervene as the lender of last resort 
generates changes of behavior in financial markets. This calls for greater responsibility by the Fed 
for regulating financial markets to “guide the evolution of financial institutions by favoring 
                                                 
17
 Minsky's Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, however, offers an agenda for economic reform that is not consistent with Galbraith's 
position. An industrial policy promoting competitive markets is a major element in the Minsky program. In fact, in his first chapter, 
Minsky notes that Henry C. Simons's "A Positive Program for Laissez-Faire" contains "a model of political economy" that is (despite 
the passage of over fifty years) "still worth considering" [Minsky 1986a, p. 9, n. 7]. [1] Since Minsky is a major figure in the post-
Keynesian movement, the connection between his policy recommendations and those of an individual associated with the so-called 
"Chicago School" of economics is one that deserves attention. 
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stability-enhancing and discourage instability-augmenting institutions and practices” (Minsky, 
1986, p. 314). Greater reliance on prudential supervision of banks is one of his foremost 
recommendations. 
 
Minsky also proposed several of reforms in the financial arena. He was approval of a more secure 
and prosperous international finance system, including stable exchange rates and an international 
lender of last resort (Minsky & Whalen, 1996, p. 16).  His policy recommendations were 
designed to promote a successful form of capitalism and these policies meant to constrain 
instability through creation of various institutional ceilings and floors.  While at the same time 
they would have to address the behavioral changes induced by reduction of instability. His 
proposals were completely outside the box of the 'invisible handwaves' of free market ideologues. 
 
5; Conclusion:. We can‘t have a capitalistic system free of crises, in the same vein It is not 
possible to set risks in financial markets to zero, however to curb these risks with a sensible 
economic policy is a probable.  Many undesirable trends in financial markets are attributable to 
the dismantling of institutional restrictions on financing procedures which gave rise to mounting 
uncertainties and riskiness in financial markets .Current crises had told us that more Laissez Faire 
and re-introducing previously dismantled regulatory measures are not a suitable option to have 
more stable system. Markets needs institutions and an international institutional design that 
accords with the developed financial markets is the need of hour. Walter Bagehot truly said 135 
years ago that ―Money does not manage itself‖. The current crisis also teaches us important 
lessons that markets are unable to manage themselves when the question is of preserving the 
macroeconomic and financial stability.  To contain the evils that market systems can inflict, 
capitalist economies must developed sets of institutions and authorities, which can be 
characterized as the equivalent of circuit breakers keeping in view the evolution of capitalistic 
economies in the last 30 years. 
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